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VIRTUE AS THE END OF LAW: 
AN ARETAIC THEORY OF LEGISLATION* 
 
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM** 
“Laws for the encouragement of virtue, and prevention of vice and immorality, shall be 
made and constantly kept in force, and provision shall be made for their due execution.” 
-- Constitution of Pennsylvania (1776) 1 
INTRODUCTION: NORMATIVE THEORIES OF LEGISLATION 
An aretaic theory of legislation claims that the aim of law should be to promote human 
flourishing, consisting of lives of social and rational activities that express the human 
excellences or virtues.  A theory of legislation can be virtue-centered in two senses.  First, 
the conceptual framework of the theory focuses our attention on the role of character and 
virtue in general legal theory.  Second, the central claim of the theory is that the promotion 
of virtue is the most important aim of legislation.  An aretaic account of legislation does 
for normative legal theory what virtue ethics does for moral philosophy.2 
Normative theories of legislation aim to provide guidance to lawmakers, answering the 
question, “What should be the end of law?”  Theories of legislation are many and varied, 
but they can usefully be sorted into three familiar families: consequentialist, deontological, 
and aretaic. 
Consequentialist theories maintain that the end of law is the maximization of good 
consequences.  Members of this family include welfarism and utilitarianism, and it is 
characteristic of such theories that they assume an ex ante stance, evaluating present 
actions on the basis of future states of affairs.  For example, a consequentialist theory of 
legislation might hold that the criminal law should aim at optimal deterrence. 
Deontological theories hold that the end of law should be understood as the 
implementation of a system of moral rules or principles, for example, the prohibition of 
moral wrongs and the protection of moral rights.3  Examples of deontological theories 
include Kant’s theory of law.4  Dworkin’s theory, law as integrity, may also be a member 
                                                 
* © 2017 by the author.  Permission is hereby granted to reproduce this essay in whole or in part for 
educational and scholarly purposes. 
** Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 Constitution of Pennsylvania § 45 (1776).  Similar provisions are found in other early state constitutions. 
2 For an introduction, see Lawrence B. Solum, ‘Law and Virtue’ in Lorraine Besser-Jones & Michael Slote 
(eds) Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics (Routledge 2015).  For a helpful critique of aretaic theories of 
legislation from a public choice perspective, see Donald J. Kochan, ‘The Mask of Virtue: Theories of Aretaic 
Legislation in a Public Choice Perspective’ (2014) 58 Saint Louis University Law Journal 295. 
3 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Harvard University Press 2002). 
4 See Arthur Ripstein, ‘Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 
1391. 
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of this family.5  Characteristically, members of this family support legislation that 
evaluates actions ex post; for example, a deontological theory of legislation might hold that 
the criminal law should be guided by retribution, imposing deserved punishments for 
moral wrongs. 
Let us define an aretaic theory of legislation as one that posits the promotion of virtue as 
the central aim of law.  The aretaic family of theories of legislation can be further 
subdivided, corresponding to different views about the nature of the human excellences or 
virtues.  The family includes Neo-Aristotelian, Stoic, Confucian, and Humean variants, but 
for the purposes of this essay, we will assume: (1) that humans flourish by living lives of 
rational and social activities that express the human excellences or virtues, (2) that the 
virtues are dispositional qualities of mind or character, and (3) that the virtues are both 
intellectual (including theoretical and practical wisdom) and moral (including courage, 
good temper, justice, and temperance). 
One more comment about the idea of a normative theory of legislation.  We can 
distinguish two different kinds of theories about legislation.  One type of theory looks at 
the aims of legislation; that is the kind of theory on offer here.  Another type of theory 
looks at the institutional structures that are most likely to achieve these aims; such theories 
might be called “normative constitutional theories” if we understand “constitution” in the 
broad sense that refers to the basic institutional structures of a given community.6  One 
component of constitutional regimes in the broad sense could be a written or unwritten 
“constitution” in the narrow sense. 
This essay does not sketch an institutional or constitutional theory of legislative 
institutions, with the following exception.  The ideal or best constitution would aim for 
lawmakers who possess the virtues.  This aim was articulated in the Vermont Constitution 
of 1777, which provided, “The House of Representatives of the Freemen of this State, shall 
consist of persons most noted for wisdom and virtue, to be chosen by the freemen of every 
town in this State, respectively.”7  Whether this aim can be achieved in practice is a 
complex empirical question, and if the answer to that question were negative, then a non-
ideal aretaic constitutional theory would need to adopt a second-best solution.  The second-
best approach might a constitutional design that frustrates viscous legislation through 
federalism, a combination of separation of powers and check and balances, and limitations 
on constitutional powers. 
FRAMEWORK: ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This essay provides a preliminary sketch of an aretaic theory of legislation.  The 
development of an aretaic theory of legislation requires a theory of the virtues.  Among the 
possible approaches are accounts of virtue drawn from Aristotle, the Stoics, Hume, and 
Confucius.8  This essay adopts a model theory of the virtues that draws on Neo-Aristotelian 
                                                 
5 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
6 This distinction is sometimes expressed by contrasting “constitution” with “constitutionalism” or by 
differentiating the “large C Constitution” from the “small c constitution.”  See Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities 
of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1225. 
7 Constitution of Vermont, Chapter II, Section VII (1777). 
8 For exploration of a Confucian approach, see Lawrence Solum and Linghao Wang, ‘Confucian Virtue 
Jurisprudence’ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai, (eds) Law, Virtue and Justice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2012). 
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ideas, incorporating modified versions of Aristotle’s account of flourishing and the virtues.  
The model theory is a simplified version of ideas from contemporary virtue ethics—and 
owes a great debt to work by Rosalind Hursthouse9 and Gavin Lawrence.10  The model 
theory is merely laid out: no attempt is made to provide arguments in support of this account. 
What is human flourishing (or eudaimonia)?  Human flourishing consists of lives of 
rational and social activities that express the human excellences.  Thus, flourishing is a 
characteristic of whole lives and not of individual moments.  Flourishing is a function of 
activity.  This means that mental states, such as pleasure or satisfaction are not themselves 
flourishing—although flourishing may produce such positive mental states.  Flourishing 
requires rational activity, because humans are creatures that reason and can act on the basis 
of reasons.  Flourishing requires social activity, because humans are social creatures who 
communicate and interact with one another.  Finally, flourishing involves activities that 
express the human excellences or virtues. 
What are the human excellences?  They are the dispositional qualities that are partly 
constitutive of human flourishing.  Following Aristotle, we can identify moral and 
intellectual virtues.  Although Aristotle classified the virtue of justice as a moral virtue, I 
will treat justice as a distinct category. 
The moral virtues, including courage, good temper, and temperance, are dispositions with 
respect to morally neutral emotions, respectively fear, anger, and desire.  Thus, a courageous 
human is disposed to feel the emotion of fear in a way that is proportionate to the threat or 
danger that elicits the fear and to respond to the emotion properly.  The vice of cowardice 
characteristically involves the disposition to disproportionate or exaggerated fear.  The vice 
of rashness characteristically involves a disposition of fear that does not adequately reflect 
the danger, and hence is associated with inappropriate risk-taking.  A similar pattern exists 
with respect to the emotion of anger and the associated virtue of good temper, and the 
emotion of desire and the associated virtue of temperance.  In each case, the virtue is a 
disposition to the mean with respect to a morally neutral emotion with associated vices of 
excess and deficiency. 
The intellectual virtues are dispositional qualities of mind.  Among the intellectual virtues 
are sophia or theoretical wisdom and phronesis or practical wisdom.  Theoretical wisdom is 
roughly the ability to think well about complex and abstract matters.  Thus theoretical 
wisdom facilitates the mastery of mathematics or complex legal doctrines.  Practical wisdom 
can be understood in various ways, but the model theory adopts the perceptual account 
offered by Nancy Sherman.11  Humans with phronesis are able to perceive the morally salient 
aspect of a choice situation and to identify workable responses. 
The virtue of justice is especially important to virtue jurisprudence.  More will be said 
about justice below, but at this stage, the key idea is that justice is a disposition to internalize 
widely shared and deeply held social norms (or nomoi) that govern human interaction.  We 
can call this conception of justice, “Justice as Lawfulness” (hereinafter capitalized to mark 
the sense of the phrase that is stipulated here), where the term lawfulness is understood in a 
wide sense that includes social norms and positive enactments—to the extent that such 
enactments are recognized as authoritative by the relevant social norms. 
                                                 
9 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press 1999). 
10 Gavin Lawrence, ‘Human Excellence in Character and Intellect’ in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed) A 
Companion to Aristotle 419 (Blackwell 2013). 
11 Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character (Clarendon Press 1989). 
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Assumption: The Consistency of the Model Theory with Cognitive and Social Science 
The model theory makes empirical assumptions.  Thus, the model theory assumes that 
humans are rational and social creatures.  This assumption should not be controversial.  
Evidence that humans use reason and that they are naturally social is ubiquitous.  But the 
account of the virtues offered here has been challenged empirically, notably by John Doris 
in his monograph, Lack of Character.12  Doris draws on social psychology, and in particular 
on the view called “situationalism,” to challenge the existence of the dispositional states (or 
character traits) that the model theory of the virtues assumes.  The most radical version of 
situationalism posits that human behavior is entirely a product of situations; every individual 
would behave in the same way if they were placed in an identical situation.  Doris’s work 
has given rise to a vigorous debate in philosophy, and at the same time, situationalism has 
been criticized by psychologists who argue for the existence of character traits. 
This essay simply assumes that a Neo-Aristotelian account of the virtues is correct.  This 
assumption seems consistent with common sense and widely shared human experience.  
Most adults have encountered someone who seems to have an anger management problem 
or to lack control over their desires and others who are good-tempered and prudent. 
Assumption: Naturalist Metaethics 
Virtue ethics is a moral theory with metaethical foundations.  For the purposes of this 
essay, I will assume a simple version of naturalist metaethics. That is, I will assume that 
morality is a natural phenomenon, subject to a kind of investigation that is continuous with 
the natural sciences.  Thus, we can ask the question what sort of life is good for humans in 
the same way that an ethologist can ask what kind of life is good for eagles or salmon.  A 
good eagle life involves successful hunting and reproduction.  As a consequence, eagles need 
keen eyesight and strong wings to flourish.  A good human life is much more complicated, 
because humans are rational and social creatures.  The model theory offers an account of the 
good life for humans and of the characteristics that humans need to lead a flourishing life.  
This account of metaethics draws on the ideas of Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson.13 
The naturalistic-metaethics assumption raises questions about the relationship of the 
model theory to evolutionary biology.  The model theory assumes that human individuals 
and communities are the relevant subjects of the virtues, but one can imagine another version 
of naturalism that focuses on genomes or genes or that the naturalistic interpretation of 
human flourishing is reproductive success.  These concerns are important, but on this 
occasion they are bracketed. 
Assumption: A Partially Ideal Theory 
Normative legal theories can be ideal or non-ideal.  Let us define an ideal theory as one 
that assumes (1) that citizens are willing to comply with the general requirements of the 
theory, and (2) that social and material conditions are such that the theory can be 
implemented.  We engage in non-ideal theory when we relax these assumptions.14  In the 
                                                 
12 John Doris, Lack of Character (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
13 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford University Press 2003); Michael Thompson, Life and Action: 
Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought (Harvard University Press 2012). 
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971). 
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discussion that follows, I will simply assume that conditions are such that the requirements 
of a virtue-centered theory of legislation could be implemented.  That is, I will assume that 
political and social conditions are such that a legislature could legislate with the aim of 
bringing about human flourishing and that material conditions are such that widespread 
human flourishing could be achieved. 
In the actual world, these assumptions are likely to be controversial.  Thus, some versions 
of social choice theory assume that legislators are inherently self-interested and hence that 
the notion of legislation that deliberately aims at the flourishing of human individuals and 
communities is bad utopianism.15  This essay meets this challenge indirectly.  We begin with 
ideal theory, and this opens the door to further questions about institutional design under 
non-ideal conditions.16 
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION IN THE PROMOTION OF VIRTUE 
The model theory of human flourishing and the virtues has an obvious implication for the 
normative theory of legislation.  Legislation should aim at the promotion of human 
flourishing.  Human flourishing requires peace and prosperity, so legislation should aim at 
the elimination of violence and poverty.  Human flourishing requires lives of rational and 
social activity, so legislation should aim at creating vibrant communities with opportunities 
for meaningful work and play that engage our rational capacities.  Human flourishing 
requires the virtues, so legislation should aim at creating the conditions for healthy emotional 
and intellectual development. 
How can legislation accomplish these goals?  I begin with peace and prosperity, the 
preconditions of human flourishing. 
Promoting the Preconditions of Human Flourishing 
Happiness or eudaimonia consists in “living well and doing well,” as Aristotle is 
sometimes translated.17  Peace and prosperity are (usually and in some sense, almost always) 
preconditions for lives lived well.  It seems uncontroversial that peace and prosperity are 
conducive to a flourishing life.  Violence and poverty limit human possibilities in significant 
ways.  Pervasive violence will result in significant pain and suffering, disabling injuries, and 
death.  Severe poverty can result in malnutrition, starvation, and many other afflictions.  
Even if peace and prosperity were not preconditions for the development of the human 
excellences, legislation would still properly aim at the creation and maintenance of these 
conditions as constituent elements of flourishing human lives. 
But peace and prosperity are also important because of the role they play in the 
development of human capacities.  Emotional and intellectual growth is likely to be stunted 
under conditions of pervasive violence and poverty.  Children who grow up in chaotic and 
violent conditions are likely to suffer from emotional problems that make the acquisition of 
                                                 
15 This kind of objection is pressed in Kochan, The Mask of Virtue (n 2). 
16 For an exploration of these issues, see Lawrence B. Solum, ‘The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory’ 
(2004/2005) 70 Brooklyn Law Review 475. 
17 For the Greek, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book I, Chapter iv, 1095a15–20 (H. Rackham trans., 
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1934).  Irwin as well as Broadie and Rowe use 
“living well and doing well.” See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 97 (Sarah Broadie & Christopher Rowe trans., 
Oxford University Press 2002); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 1985). 
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courage, good temper, and temperance less likely.  Disorder undermines the processes of 
intellectual growth that produce practical and theoretical wisdom.  And it seems likely that 
poverty will have similar effects.  Extreme deprivation during childhood and adolescence is 
not conducive to healthy emotional or intellectual development. 
Finally, peace and prosperity create the conditions in which rational and social human 
activities are likely or possible.  Of course, many different activities are rational or social, or 
both.  The lives of a craftsperson, merchant, engineer, computer programmer, scholar, or 
public servant all can involve rational and social activities that express the human 
excellences.  Both vocations and avocations can involve such activity: playing a musical 
instrument, painting, photography, sport, and perhaps even participation in a fantasy football 
league, as well as countless other activities outside of work, can form parts of flourishing 
human lives.  Peace and prosperity facilitate these activities by creating opportunities for 
meaningful employment and by creating the time and resources that enable meaningful 
avocational pursuits. 
How can legislation promote peace and prosperity?  For the most part, this important 
question is outside the scope of this essay.  Some answers to this question are obvious.  The 
criminal law should forbid and punish violence.  The law of nations should forbid aggressive 
wars.  Other answers are more controversial.  What institutional arrangements are conducive 
to the kind of prosperity that enables flourishing?  Some believe that the answer to this 
question involves a minimalist state that creates the conditions for laissez-faire markets and 
private ownership of the means of production and that maximizes free choice by consumers 
and workers.  Others believe that market capitalism results in harsh conditions for workers 
and the promotion of mindless consumption that is inconsistent with capitalism.  There are 
many other possibilities, but the choice between the feasible alternatives depends on the 
answers to complex empirical questions that are far outside the scope of this essay. 
Nonetheless, an aretaic theory of legislation can and should address questions about the 
kind of peace and prosperity that is conducive to human flourishing.  It might be the case 
that stability could be maximized and violence minimized by an authoritarian social order 
that would undermine flourishing in other ways.  Certainly, flourishing would be 
undermined by a police state that controls violence through fear and intimidation created by 
a system of secret police, informants, and mass surveillance.  Likewise, the kind of 
prosperity that enables human flourishing might differ from simple maximization of gross 
domestic product.  Legislation should aim at the right kind of peace and prosperity. 
Facilitating the Development and Acquisition of the Virtues 
Legislation should facilitate the development and acquisition of the virtues.  How can this 
be accomplished?  Again, this is a complex empirical question.  To give a fully adequate 
answer, we would need to understand the cognitive, social, and developmental psychology 
of the virtues.  Given the current state of neuroscience, cognitive science, and the social 
sciences, it seems likely that there is a good deal of uncertainty about the mechanisms by 
which the virtues are acquired. 
Despite this uncertainty, we may be able to develop working hypotheses.  It seems likely 
that nurturing family environments facilitate healthy emotional development by children.  
Therefore, legislation should aim at conditions in which children are attached to stable, 
loving family environments.  Similarly, the law should aim to prevent domestic violence and 
child abuse.  Moreover, nurturing families may be fostered by generous family leave policies 
Virtue as the End of Law 
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and undermined by working conditions that do not permit parents (and other caretakers) to 
spend time with children. 
The primary strategies for facilitating the development and acquisition of the virtues seem 
likely to be indirect.  One can imagine a more direct approach.  The law might command 
parents to engage in childrearing activities that will promote healthy intellectual and 
emotional development by children.  Or the law could command that a certain number of 
hours per week be spent by parents in particular ways: two hours of reading stories, four 
hours of adult–child playtime, seven hours of family mealtime, and so forth.  An army of 
social workers might employ electronic surveillance and instructional home visits to enforce 
these commands.  But it seems unlikely that the direct approach would actually work.  
Common sense suggests that laws mandating specific parenting practices would likely do 
more harm than good. 
Establishing the Infrastructure for Meaningful Work and Recreation 
How can the law promote rational and social activities that express the human 
excellences?  Again, the answer depends on complex empirical questions.  The goal is to 
provide a social structure that supports meaningful work and play.   
Human history suggests that some forms of economic organization are better than others 
in meeting this goal.  Modern developed societies (e.g., France, Japan, and Norway) may 
have serious flaws, but they seem to do a better job at providing opportunities for rational 
and social activities that express the human excellences than did the feudal societies of 
Europe in the so-called Dark Ages or the Soviet Union under Stalin.  But there is likely to 
be substantial debate about the comparative merits of Scandinavian-style social democracy 
versus the more market-oriented approach in the United States.  From the perspective of an 
aretaic theory of legislation, the relevant question is which form of social organization best 
supports human flourishing. 
An aretaic theory of legislation sets the goal—providing opportunities for rational and 
social activities that express the human excellences.  Various configurations of employment 
law, labor law, property law, and so forth will do better or worse at meeting this goal.  The 
question as to which configuration is best will depend on the answers to empirical questions 
that are outside the scope of a normative theory of legislation. 
Legislation and the Virtue of Justice as Lawfulness 
The discussion so far has excluded consideration of the virtue of justice.  But if justice is 
a virtue, then it surely has implications for the ends of law.  But what is the content of the 
virtue of justice?  My strategy for answering this question begins with the rejection of two 
accounts of the virtue of justice that I believe are mistaken.  This leads to a third account, 
which I shall call “Justice as Lawfulness.”  I then turn to the implication of this third view 
of justice for an aretaic theory of legislation. 
If justice were like the other moral virtues, it would be a disposition to the mean with 
respect to a morally neutral emotion.  But what emotion?  One possibility is that justice is 
connected with the vice of graspingness or wanting more than one’s share—this possibility 
inspires the first account of justice.  There are well-known difficulties with this possibility.  
Graspingness can have many emotional causes—aiming for more than one’s share can be 
caused by fear, anger, or intemperance, but these emotions are connected with other 
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distinctive virtues.  Moreover, if graspingness were a vice of excess, the question arises as 
to what is the corresponding vice of deficiency.  Aiming for less than one’s proper share is 
not usually considered injustice.  Moreover, the virtue of justice can be exercised by 
executives and judges, but official injustice may have nothing to do with greed. 
A second account of justice is inspired by the thought that justice is simply the disposition 
to do the just thing as specified by an independent theory.  On this account, justice as a virtue 
differs in kind from the model of a disposition to the mean with respect to a morally neutral 
emotion.  Instead, the content of justice is given by a theoretical account of just actions, and 
the virtue is simply the disposition to act in accord with the requirements of the theory.  The 
difficulty with the second view is that this account of the virtue of justice threatens to 
undermine the rest of virtue ethics.  This can be seen by imagining that the content of the 
theory of justice is provided by one of the familiar views, for example, by some form of 
deontology or consequentialism.  If the virtue of justice were the disposition to act in accord 
with Kantian deontology, then that theory (and not virtue jurisprudence) would specify the 
aim of legislation. 
The third account of justice is Justice as Lawfulness.  The core idea is that justice is a 
disposition to be lawful, but in a special sense that departs from the idea that lawfulness 
reduces to a disposition to obey the positive law.  This departure is illuminated by 
substituting a stipulated concept of a nomos for the notion of positive law.  Let us use the 
term nomoi in this stipulated sense to refer to the deeply held and widely shared social norms 
of a community with human flourishing.  The positive laws of a given community can play 
a role similar to the nomoi to the extent that they are promulgated by institutions or persons 
whose authority is recognized by the relevant social norms and so long as the content of the 
positive laws is consistent with substantive content of the system of nomoi.  Many positive 
laws correspond directly to widely shared and deeply held social norms: laws prohibiting 
murder and theft are like this. 
Other positive laws create new conventional rules that are consistent with the nomoi, but 
not required by them, for example, the traffic laws requiring that automobiles be driven on 
the left in the United Kingdom and on the right in most other nations.  Once established as 
positive law by authority-recognizing nomoi, these rules may be internalized and become 
nomoi (widely shared and deeply held social norms). 
Yet another possibility is that the positive law may directly conflict with the nomoi: in 
this case, there are further possibilities, corresponding to different ways in which the nomoi 
and the positive law can interact.  The positive law may act as a technology of normative 
change—dislodging entrenched social norms through coercion, education, or some other 
mechanism.  But another possibility is that the positive law may coexist with contrary social 
norms.  Again, various consequences may follow.  The positive law may simply fail to 
function to guide behavior: in the extreme case, even officials may subvert the positive law.  
Or the positive law may function imperfectly with a subgroup of officials complying with 
(or even internalizing) the positive law while most members of the community resist, 
disobeying the law except in cases where the threat of punishment is sufficient to coerce 
compliance. 
There is no guarantee that the social norms of a particular community at a particular time 
are consistent with human flourishing.  From the perspective of virtue jurisprudence, we 
might say that these social norms are not true nomoi—they are social norms that undermine 
the function of law: the promotion of human flourishing.  The problem of distinguishing true 
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from false nomoi is a problem of knowledge and epistemic virtue.  In some cases, even fully 
virtuous humans (the phronomoi who possess all the virtues including practical wisdom) 
may have mistaken empirical beliefs, but lack knowledge of the facts that would correct their 
mistakes. 
When the law undermines human flourishing but we lack access to knowledge that would 
reveal this state of affairs, even the wise may internalize social norms that operate causally 
to undermine human flourishing.  Perhaps this has been the case with utopian communities 
who believed in good faith that their social experiments would promote human flourishing 
and then learned that the opposite was true.  In other cases, the wise may understand that a 
social norm is contrary to human flourishing while most (or even almost all) of the 
community believes the opposite.  Perhaps this has been the case with oppressive but deeply 
entrenched social norms—such as the norms that supported slavery in the ancient world or 
the antebellum southern United States.  Under these circumstances, a fully virtuous agent 
with access to knowledge of the true relationship between the law and human flourishing 
should cooperate in actions that will facilitate normative change.  One technology of 
normative change may be political action that transforms the positive law first and then 
brings social norms into harmony with a combination of coercion and education.  But in 
some circumstances, nonviolent civil disobedience or violent revolution may be the best 
response to oppressive legal and social norms. 
From the perspective of virtue jurisprudence, the virtue of Justice as Lawfulness enables 
us to see justice as a natural human virtue that (imperfectly) promotes human flourishing 
and is itself a constitutive element of such flourishing.  Given the circumstances of justice 
(scarcity and partiality), the internalization of social norms is necessary for the flourishing 
of individuals and their communities.  Given the limitations on human knowledge of the 
complex causal effects that norms produce, the social norms of any given community at any 
given point of time are likely (or sure) to be imperfect.  Virtuous agents internalize the widely 
shared and deeply held social norms of their community so long as the agents believe these 
norms are consistent with human flourishing.  This entails the internalization of norms that 
are suboptimal—a better norm might be theoretically feasible—but a virtuous agent will 
nonetheless internalize the existing norm.  The alternative is for each agent to make his own 
judgment about what norms should govern, but that alternative is incapable of achieving the 
very great goods that result from the rule of law and its attendant functional benefits: 
stability, certainty, uniformity, and predictability of the system of social interaction.  In 
complex societies, authority-recognizing norms play a particularly important function.  In 
communities of communities, disagreement about social norms is inevitable and the 
complexity of life requires the legal institution of conventional solutions to problems of 
social interaction. 
Affirming Justice as Lawfulness has many implications that cannot be discussed on this 
occasion.  It implies that an action can be just in one community and unjust in another—
where the two communities have adopted inconsistent conventional solutions to a complex 
problem of social interaction.  It implies that justice is primarily a function of social groups 
and not individual judgments of conscience.  In these ways and others, Justice as Lawfulness 
conflicts with ideas that are central to some deontological and consequentialist views about 
the right and the good. 
Lawrence B. Solum 
 10 
Promoting Virtuous Activity, Discouraging Vicious Action 
Virtue cannot be legislated directly.  If we stipulate that a virtuous action is an action that 
would characteristically be performed by a virtuous agent and that a vicious action is one 
that would characteristically be performed by a vicious agent, then the law can require many 
kinds of virtuous actions and forbid many kinds of vicious actions, but the law cannot require 
agents to perform the right action for the right reasons or forbid the performance of the right 
action for the wrong reasons.  Motives or reasons for action are not subject to direct legal 
control. 
Requiring virtuous action and forbidding vicious action is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the inculcation of virtue.  The virtues might be acquired by a child 
raised to adulthood by nurturing parents in a society with bad laws.  And a child raised to 
adulthood by neglectful or abusive parents might fail to acquire the virtues—even in a 
society where the law requires all virtuous actions and forbids all vicious actions. 
Nonetheless, the laws of a well-functioning community will surely forbid many vicious 
actions and require many virtuous ones.  This is not because there is some rule of virtue that 
requires that the positive law mirror the virtuous agent.  Such a rule would be inconsistent 
with the structure of an aretaic theory of law, which identifies human flourishing as the 
ultimate normative standard. 
Sometimes human flourishing will best be promoted by permitting vicious actions or by 
failing to require virtuous ones.  Take the example of drug prohibition.  Let us assume that 
that the use of certain drugs, for example crystal meth, is inconsistent with human 
flourishing.  These drugs interfere with rational and social activities that express the human 
excellences.  They damage physical, emotional, and intellectual health.  Nonetheless, it 
might be the case that the legal prohibition of such drugs will undermine rather than promote 
human flourishing.  Criminalization may result in unintended consequences that are worse 
than permitting legal use of these substances. 
For example, criminalization might (1) create black markets characterized by violence, 
(2) cause some users to disengage from healthy communities and affiliate instead with an 
unhealthy drug subculture, and (3) make the drug use less safe because of impurities, dirty 
needles, and so forth.  In addition, criminalization may not be effective in reducing the use 
of the harmful substances.  And criminalization is likely to result in the imposition of 
punishments that have harmful effects that exceed the harms caused by use of the substances.  
Under these circumstances, the best way for the law to promote virtue may be 
decriminalization or legalization accompanied by programs of education and treatment.  The 
law might support nomoi that discourage use of these substances with informal social 
sanctions and that encourage addicts to seek effective treatment. 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER NORMATIVE THEORIES OF LEGISLATION 
A full comparison of an aretaic theory of legislation with its competitors cannot be 
accomplished in a short essay.  The alternatives would need to be developed in their strongest 
forms.  Comparison would require consideration of a wide variety of legal problems: even 
if a deontological theory did a better job handling the problem of criminal punishment and 
a consequentialist theory were superior for competition law, it might nonetheless turn out 
that a virtue-centered theory of the ends of law is best, all things considered. 
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Virtue versus Welfare 
Nonetheless, some points of comparison may be illuminating.  When we compare a 
virtue-centered approach to welfarism, some similarities and differences are immediately 
visible.  The view that human flourishing is the end of law might be characterized as 
eudaimonist consequentialism, but this label would be misleading as applied to an aretaic 
theory of legislation that takes the virtue of justice as a constitutive element of human 
flourishing.  Because justice acts as a constraint on legislation, the kind of theory sketched 
here does not take the maximization of flourishing as the sole criterion for the goodness of 
legislation. 
In some versions of normative law and economics—Pareto efficiency and Kaldor Hicks 
are examples18—direct interpersonal utility comparisons are ruled out.  Welfarism allows 
for the weighting of preferences, but takes preferences as they are—they are the ultimate 
standard of value and not themselves subject to normative evaluation.  An aretaic theory of 
legislation takes the shaping of preferences as one of the primary functions of law.  
Flourishing humans prefer to engage in rational and social activities that promote the human 
excellences—so a virtue-centered approach to legislation aims to promote preferences that 
are consistent with flourishing and to discourage preferences that undermine flourishing.  
This is a deep theoretical difference. 
Justice as Lawfulness assigns value to the promotion of the nomoi—that is, it values the 
development of communities that encourage the internalization of the widely shared and 
deeply held social norms that are consistent with human flourishing.  Welfarism takes such 
norms into account to the extent they are reflected in individual preferences, and to the extent 
that conformity to such norms instrumentally promotes preference satisfaction, welfarism 
will take that into account.  But this approach is fundamentally different from the stance 
taken by an aretaic theory of legislation that incorporates the lawfulness account of justice.  
The account offered here values lawfulness as a constitutive element of human flourishing. 
Virtue versus Fairness 
Deontological theories of legislation take the promotion of fairness or the protection of 
rights as the fundamental (or even the only) aim of legislation.  An aretaic theory of 
legislation takes fairness on board via the virtue of justice, but the role of fairness (or rights) 
is transformed.  Considering a simplified and simplistic deontological theory brings out the 
difference.  Let us stipulate that “strong libertarianism” is the deontological theory of 
legislation that holds that the only aim of law is to protect the property and personal rights 
of individuals: no other aim is permissible.  Strong libertarianism rules out legislation that 
aims at the promotion of virtue—although the adherents of this view might argue that the 
libertarian state will do a better job of inculcating virtue than would a more parentalistic 
“nanny state.”  An aretaic theory has a role for the state in protecting personal and property 
rights, but liberty is a supporting character and not the lead actor.  The aretaic conception 
allows legislation that aims at directing the promotion of virtue and would permit the 
modification or qualification of rights, if so doing were required for human flourishing. 
                                                 
18 For discussion of the various forms of normative law and economics, see Matthew D. Adler, ‘Beyond 
Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation’ (2000) 28 Florida State University Law Review 
241 (2000). 
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CONCLUSION: THE ARETAIC TURN IN NORMATIVE THEORIES OF LEGISLATION 
Modern normative legal theory reflects ideas in modern moral philosophy.  For most of 
the twentieth century, deontological and consequentialist theories of the ends of law have 
dominated general jurisprudence.  Virtue ethics is a relatively recent development.  Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s famous essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” published in 1958, was a starting 
point.19  The work of Peter Geach,20 Philippa Foot21 and others in the 1960s represents 
another important step.  Work accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s.  Over the course of the 
last quarter century or so, aretaic approaches to moral theory have come to be seen as serious 
rivals of consequentialist and utilitarian approaches. 
Normative legal theory has lagged behind.  Serious work on virtue jurisprudence began 
in the 1980s, and it is only in the past decade or so that a substantial body of scholarship has 
emerged.  An aretaic theory of legislation is an essential part of virtue jurisprudence.  The 
aim of this short essay has been to provide a glimpse of the kind of work that has just begun. 
                                                 
19 Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) 33 Philosophy 1. 
20 Peter Thomas Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge University Press 1977). 
21 See Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (University of California Press 1978). 
